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MEANS-END SCRUTINY IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Russell W. Galloway*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses means-end scrutiny, the most common form
of analysis used by courts in enforcing constitutional limits on govern-
ment action.' The discussion has three parts: (1) a description of the
components, levels and types of means-end scrutiny; (2) a critical analy-
sis of some problems presented by means-end scrutiny; and (3) several
suggestions concerning modifications that might clarify means-end scru-
tiny and make it a more predictable and effective method for enforcing
constitutional limits.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Components, Levels and Types of Means-End Scrutiny
Means-end scrutiny is an analytical process involving examination
of the purposes (ends) which conduct is designed to serve and the meth-
ods (means) chosen to further those purposes. When government action
is subject to a constitutional limit, courts frequently evaluate the justifi-
cation for that action. If a sufficient justification exists, the action may be
permitted despite the applicability of the limit. If the courts find the jus-
tification insufficient, they hold that the action violates the limit and is
unconstitutional. Means-end scrutiny is a systematic method for evalu-
ating the sufficiency of the government's justification for its conduct.
Means-end scrutiny is not the only test used for enforcing constitu-
tional limits,2 but it is the most common and important form of constitu-
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law; Director, Supreme Court History Project; member, California bar.
1. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93 (1985), which states, "judicial
scrutiny of means-ends relationships .-.. may well be the most frequently invoked technique in
the judicial review of the validity of federal and state legislation." Means-end scrutiny is used,
for example, in enforcing the requirements of substantive due process, equal protection, free-
dom of speech, free exercise of religion, the necessary and proper clause, the dormant com-
merce clause, the contract clause and the privileges and immunities clause.
2. Other constitutional tests include the clear and present danger test, the actual malice
test, ad hoc multi-factor balancing tests, and many more.
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tional analysis. To grasp how means-end scrutiny works, one must
understand the components and levels of the process.
1. The three components of means-end scrutiny
Means-end scrutiny has three components: (1) scrutiny of govern-
ment interests; (2) scrutiny of the effectiveness of the means chosen to
further the government interests; and (3) scrutiny of alternatives to deter-
mine whether less restrictive methods are available for furthering the
government interests. Some forms of means-end scrutiny involve all
three components; others involve only the first two.
a. scrutiny of government interests
The first component of means-end scrutiny involves analysis of the
interests served by the challenged government action. To justify a con-
clusion that the government action is constitutional, the court must find
that the action is related to some permissible government interest or pur-
pose and that such purpose is sufficiently substantial to satisfy the appli-
cable level of scrutiny. This component is often called "end scrutiny."
b. scrutiny of the effectiveness of the means
The second component of means-end scrutiny involves analysis of
the effectiveness of the means chosen by the government to further its
interests. To justify a conclusion that the government action is constitu-
tional, the court must find that the means are at least an arguably ra-
tional method for furthering the government's goals. Moreover, if
intensified means-end scrutiny is applicable, the court must find the
means demonstrably and substantially effective in furthering the govern-
ment's interests.' This second component of means-end scrutiny is nor-
mally considered to be part of "means scrutiny," although strict scrutiny
cases confusingly lump it with end scrutiny.4
c. scrutiny of alternatives
The third component of means-end scrutiny involves analysis of the
availability of less restrictive alternatives for furthering the government's
interests. This component, which clearly involves "means scrutiny," is
only used in cases where intensified means-end scrutiny is applicable. In
cases where "unintensified" means-end scrutiny-more commonly re-
3. This component is often not clearly articulated in the cases, but it definitely is a stan-
dard ingredient of intensified scrutiny.
4. See infra p. 463.
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ferred to as rationality review-is applicable, only the first two compo-
nents are used. If intensified means-end scrutiny is applicable, the court
must find the government action unconstitutional unless the means cho-
sen are "necessary" or "narrowly tailored" to achieve the government's
goals, i.e., the means chosen must be the "least restrictive alternative"
available for achieving those goals.
2. The levels of means-end scrutiny
a. rationality review
The least intense form of means-end scrutiny is rationality review.
Often called the rational relation test or rational basis test, rationality
review has two components. The first component deals with the end (in-
terest, purpose) underlying the government action. The second compo-
nent deals with the means (method) the government has adopted.5 The
first component concerns whether any valid interest in support of the
government's conduct exists or can be conceived. The second compo-
nent concerns whether the means chosen comprise a rational method for
accomplishing any such valid purpose.6 Rationality review has two
forms, the deferential rational basis test and the nondeferential rational
relation test.7
i. the deferential rational basis test
The least intense and most common form of means-end scrutiny is
the deferential rational basis test.8 When this test is applicable, the gov-
ernment action is constitutional if it has any conceivable valid purpose
and if the means chosen are arguably rational. In such cases, a strong
presumption of constitutionality applies, and the burden of proof is on
the challenger to show either that the government has no conceivable
valid purpose or that no rational government official could believe the
means would be effective.9
5. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) ("ra-
tional means to serve a legitimate end"); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) ("rea-
sonable relation to a proper legislative purpose").
6. The third component of means-end scrutiny (scrutiny of alternatives) is not applicable
in rationality review.
7. The term "rational relation test" is commonly used to refer both to the deferential
rational basis test and the nondeferential rational relation test.
8. This test is used, for example, in substantive due process and equal protection cases
involving merely socio-economic issues and in defining the scope of Congress' delegated
powers.
9. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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Reduced to schematic outline, the deferential rational basis test is as
follows:
Deferential rational basis test
1. End scrutiny: any conceivable valid interest and
2. Means scrutiny: arguably rational means
Strong presumption of constitutionality; challenger has burden
of proof
The deferential rational basis test is so easily satisfied that it has
been nicknamed the "hands off" approach." The outcome of deferential
rationality review is virtually a foregone conclusion. In nearly all cases,
the government action is held constitutional.
ii. the nondeferential rational relation test
Sometimes, the United States Supreme Court uses a slightly more
aggressive form of rationality review, which may be called the nondefer-
ential rational relation test. This test requires the Court to find that the
government action serves an actual valid interest, which means: (1) that
the government actually has a valid purpose and (2) that the means cho-
sen to serve that purpose are demonstrably rational (effective). In con-
trast to the deferential rational basis test, the nondeferential rational
relation test requires the Court to seek proof that the government action
serves some actual valid purpose effectively. The Court will not specu-
late about conceivable ends and arguably rational means in the absence
of supporting evidence." The allocation of the burden of proof is un-
clear. Most cases hold that the burden is on the challenger, but recent
decisions suggest that the government may at times have the burden. 2
Schematically, the nondeferential rational relation test is as follows:
Nondeferential rational relation test
1. End scrutiny: actual, valid interest and
2. Means scrutiny: demonstrably rational means
In most cases, presumption of constitutionality; challenger has
burden of proof
10. G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 472.
11. See Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 21 (1972), which states:
It [rationality review 'with bite'] would have the Court assess the means in terms of
legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture.
Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means
on the basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to ratio-
nalizations created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing.
Id.
12. E.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
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The nondeferential rational relation test is rationality review with a
bite.13 The Court has found government action unconstitutional many
times using this test. 4 Nevertheless, the test is a relatively mild form of
means-end scrutiny, standing second from the bottom of the scale. 15
b. intensified scrutiny
The term "intensified scrutiny," as used in this Article, includes
those levels of means-end scrutiny not encompassed in the concept of
rationality review. As the name suggests, intensified scrutiny is a height-
ened, more aggressive, less deferential type of judicial review than ration-
ality review. Intensified scrutiny has several different levels or tiers,
which vary somewhat, especially in their end-scrutiny components. All
types of intensified scrutiny involve a presumption of unconstitutionality
and put the burden on the government to satisfy all three components of
means-end scrutiny.
i. strict scrutiny
The most intense form of means-end scrutiny is strict scrutiny.' 6
According to the Court, strict scrutiny is a two-prong test which requires
a holding of unconstitutionality unless the government action is neces-
sary to serve a compelling interest. In other words, if strict scrutiny is
applicable, the government action is unconstitutional unless: (1) it fur-
thers an actual, compelling government interest and (2) the means cho-
sen are necessary (narrowly tailored, the least restrictive alternative) for
advancing that interest. 7
13. G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 604. For a discussion of the emergence of nondeferen-
tial rationality review in the early Burger era, see Gunther, supra note 11, at 18-20. Gunther
labeled the event "a surprising new development." Id. at 12.
14. E.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612
(1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985): Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S.
869 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973);
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412 (1920); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. The reasons why the Court, in some cases, applies the nondeferential rational relation
test rather than the deferential rational basis test will be discussed below. See infra text accom-
panying notes 139-41.
16. Strict scrutiny is used in cases involving racial classifications disfavoring minorities,
content-based infringements of free speech, restrictions on free exercise of religion, and several
other kinds of infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.
17. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) ("In order to withstand strict
scrutiny, the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means avail-
able."); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) ("Such [racial] classifications are sub-
ject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary ... to the accomplishment' of their
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However, when the Court's opinions are read carefully, it is appar-
ent that strict scrutiny is a three-prong test involving all three compo-
nents of means-end scrutiny. This is because the first prong of strict
scrutiny apparently has two sub-parts: (1) the government must have an
actual, compelling purpose and (2) the means must be substantially effec-
tive for accomplishing such purpose. The substantial effectiveness re-
quirement, which is rarely mentioned in the Court's formal descriptions
of strict scrutiny, has beeh decisive in many cases,"' and its existence is
beyond serious debate.
When strict scrutiny applies, a strong presumption of unconstitu-
tionality exists and the government must show: (1) that a compelling
government interest is at stake; (2) that its action is a substantially effec-
tive means for furthering such interest; and (3) that its action is the least
restrictive alternative available for furthering such interest.
In schematic outline, strict scrutiny involves the following
components:
Strict scrutiny
1. Serves a compelling interest, i.e.
a. Compelling interest and
b. Substantially effective and
2. Necessary
Strong presumption of unconstitutionality; government has
burden of proof
In most cases, strict-scrutiny serves to invalidate the government
action. In earlier days, this was almost invariably true, giving rise to the
aphorism that strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory, and fatal in fact
.... "19 More recently, however, the Court has found strict scrutiny
satisfied on many occasions, 2° and it is now clear that strict scrutiny is by
legitimate purpose ... ."); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("the least restric-
tive means of achieving some compelling state interest"); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729
(1974) ("essential to serve a compelling state interest"); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, 262 (1974) ("necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest" (empha-
sis in original)); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) ("necessary to promote a com-
pelling government interest" (emphasis in original)); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621, 627 (1969) ("necessary to promote a compelling state interest"); Shapiro v, Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) ("necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest"
(emphasis in original)).
18. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969).
19. Gunther, supra note 11, at 8. The aphorism was never entirely accurate, since one of
the first cases applying the strict scrutiny test, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), found that strict scrutiny was met.
20. E.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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no means impossible to satisfy.
ii. intermediate scrutiny
At one time, many scholars believed that rationality review and
strict scrutiny were the only levels of means-end scrutiny, at least in
equal protection cases.21 In the mid-1970's, however, a third level of
means-end scrutiny emerged in sex discrimination cases,22 and, after
some initial resistance, the Court dubbed it intermediate scrutiny.
The initial formulation of the test was as follows: "[t]o withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives."23 It soon became
apparent that the phrase "important governmental objectives" meant
something more than a valid government interest but something less than
a compelling government interest. After some initial confusion and over
continuing objection by several Justices, the Court decided that the
phrase "substantially related" meant that the means chosen by the gov-
ernment must be both "substantially effective"24 and "narrowly tai-
lored."25 Moreover, the Court has recently indicated that "narrowly
tailored" means the same thing as "necessary. ,26
In short, intermediate scrutiny has the following structure:
Intermediate scrutiny
1. Important interest and
2. Substantial relation, i.e.,
a. Substantially effective and
b. Narrowly tailored
Intermediate presumption of unconstitutionality; government
has burden of proof
21. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-
77 (1969).
22. The seminal case was Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
23. Id. at 197. The statement was inaccurate, since the Court had not previously enunci-
ated this test in sex discrimination cases or indeed in any other context.
24. E.g., id. at 200, 202 n.14.
25. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); cf. Supreme Court
v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (privileges and immunities clause case).
26. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1850 n.6 (1986); cf. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (strict scrutiny case using "narrowly
tailored" as a synonym for "necessary"). In the recent case of Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.
v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1728 (1987), the Court confused the issue once again by stating,
"the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id. This incorrectly suggests that "necessary" means
something other than "narrowly drawn." Hopefully the Court will retract this suggestion and
be more careful in its use of language in future cases.
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The Court has vacillated concerning whether intermediate scrutiny
is more like strict scrutiny (quite intense) or more like rationality review
(rather deferential). But the latest pronouncements indicate that, at least
in sex discrimination cases, the test is a strongly intensified form of
means-end scrutiny which requires a holding of unconstitutionality un-
less the government shows an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
its action.27
iii. sub-intermediate scrutiny?
In several areas of constitutional law, the Court has adopted means-
end scrutiny tests requiring the government to show that its conduct is
substantially related to a "significant" or "substantial" government inter-
est. For example, in evaluating content-neutral time, place and manner
regulations of speech, the Court requires that the government action
serve a "significant" government interest.28 In commercial speech cases,
the Court requires a showing that government restrictions directly ad-
vance a "substantial" government interest and are necessary.2 9 Simi-
larly, in privileges and immunities clause cases, the Court requires the
government to demonstrate a "substantial" government interest.
30
It is unclear where the "significant" and "substantial" government
interest tests fit in the scale of means-end scrutiny. Apparently more is
required than the merely "valid" government interest required in ration-
ality review. Whether the words are essentially synonymous with "im-
portant" government interest or whether they reflect a sub-intermediate
intensity of end scrutiny is not clear. Indeed, it is not clear whether the
terms "significant" and "substantial" are intended to be synonymous
with each other or whether each represents a unique level of end
scrutiny.3'
In schematic form, sub-intermediate scrutiny involves the following
structure:
27. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
28. E.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649
(1981) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976)).
29. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
A concurring opinion called this test "intermediate scrutiny." Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in judgment).
30. Piper, 470 U.S. at 284; United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465
U.S. 208, 222 (1984).
31. The term "sub-intermediate scrutiny" will be used in the rest of this Article to refer to
tests requiring that government means be substantially related to a significant or substantial
interest. The reader should keep in mind, how'ever, that the Court has not used the term.
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Sub-intermediate scrutiny
1. End: significant or substantial interest and
2. Means: substantial relation, i.e.,
a. Substantially effective and
b. Necessary
Presumption of unconstitutionality; government has burden of
proof
iv. "somewhat heightened" scrutiny
Perhaps the least intense form of means-end scrutiny, other than
rationality review, is the test used in equal protection cases involving
classifications disfavoring illegitimate children. This test requires that
the government action be "substantially related to a legitimate state in-
terest."3 This is a hybrid form of means-end scrutiny that combines rela-
tively deferential end scrutiny comparable to nondeferential rationality
review with intensified scrutiny of the effectiveness of the means and the
availability of less onerous alternatives. The burden of proof is on the
government to show that all three components are met. The Court has
labeled this form of means-end scrutiny "somewhat heightened
review.""
Schematically, this form of means-end scrutiny involves the follow-
ing components:
Somewhat heightened scrutiny
1. Legitimate interest and
2. Substantial relation, i.e.,
a. Substantially effective and
b. Narrowly tailored
Presumption of unconstitutionality; government has burden of
proof
In practice, this test is very close to the nondeferential rational rela-
tion test. Indeed, in cases like City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.34 and Plyler v. Doe,35 it is difficult to determine which of
these two tests the Court used.
c. means-end scrutiny chart
The levels of means-end scrutiny described above are summarized in
32. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(same test used in case involving exclusion of children of illegal aliens from public schools).
33. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
34. Id. at 432.
35. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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the following chart, which starts with the most intense test at the top and
moves downward to the least intense form.
Means-End Scrutiny Chart
Components
Government Effectiveness
Test Interest of Means Alternatives
Strict Scrutiny Compelling Substantially Necessary
Effective
Intermediate Important Substantially Narrowly
Scrutiny Effective Tailored
Sub-intermediate Significant/ Substantially Narrowly
Scrutiny Substantial Effective Tailored
Somewhat Heightened Legitimate Substantially Narrowly
Scrutiny Effective Tailored
Rationality Review, Valid Demonstrably N/A
Nondeferential Rational
Rationality Review, Conceivable Arguably N/A
Deferential Valid Rational
3. Other types of means-end scrutiny
a. hybrid means-end scrutiny
In some cases, the Court uses hybrid versions of means-end scrutiny
involving components drawn from varying portions of the scale. An ex-
ample already mentioned is the "somewhat heightened" scrutiny used in
illegitimacy cases, which combines rationality review of the government
interest with intensified scrutiny of the means.36 Another example is the
test used in contract clause cases involving impairments of government
contracts. As the Court declared in the leading case of United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey,37 "an impairment may be constitutional if it is
reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."38 This
test seems to involve intermediate end scrutiny ("important" interest),
rationality review of the effectiveness of the means ("reasonable"),39 and
strict scrutiny of alternatives ("necessary").
36. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
37. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
38. Id. at 25.
39. The Court suggested that the rationality review should be nondeferential: "complete
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Contract clause scrutiny; public contracts
1. Important interest and
2. Means
a. Reasonable and
b. Necessary
Presumption of unconstitutionality; government has burden of
proof
Justice Brennan labeled the U.S. Trust "reasonable and necessary" test
"a most unusual hybrid which manages to merge the two polar extremes
of judicial intervention ... into one synthesis."'4
b. specialized means-end scrutiny
In some areas of constitutional law, the Court uses specialized forms
of means-end scrutiny adapted to the particular subject area covered by
the relevant constitutional limit. The end scrutiny, for example, may be
specially adapted to fit the limit, while the other components remain the
same as in previously mentioned versions.
An example of specialized means-end scrutiny is the test used in
cases involving the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, which
consists of cases involving discrimination by states against nonresidents
with regard to privileges basic to national unity. In such cases, the Court
requires that the government action be substantially related to the solu-
tion of a problem created by nonresidents.41 The end scrutiny is specially
adapted to the evil the privileges and immunities clause was intended to
correct: the question is not simply whether the interest is sufficiently
important, but whether the purpose is to solve a particular kind of prob-
lem-one caused by nonresidents. If such a purpose is shown, then the
rest of the test is the same as in intermediate and somewhat heightened
scrutiny cases.
Means-end scrutiny: privileges and immunities clause
1. Purpose to solve problem created by nonresidents and
2. Substantial relation, i.e.,
a. Substantially effective and
b. Narrowly tailored
Presumption of unconstitutionality; government has burden of
proof
deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness... is not appropriate because the State's
self-interest is at stake." Id. at 26.
40. Id. at 55 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. E.g., Piper, 470 U.S. 274; City of Camden, 465 U.S. at 222.
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c. means-end scrutiny plus
Sometimes the Court uses tests that combine means-end scrutiny
with other requirements. For example, the first amendment test for time,
place and manner regulations requires the government to prove that its
conduct: (1) is content-neutral; (2) satisfies sub-intermediate means-end
scrutiny; and (3) leaves alternative channels open for the communica-
tion.42 Similarly, regulations of electronic broadcasting are allowed if
they enhance communications to the audience and satisfy the rational
relation test.43 In such cases, the government must satisfy both the appli-
cable level of means-end scrutiny and whatever other requirements the
Court imposes.
d. sliding scales
Sometimes the Court uses means-end scrutiny that slides up or
down in intensity depending on the degree of harm caused by the govern-
ment action. For example, if the harm is severe, the means-end scrutiny
is intensified; if the harm is minor, the means-end scrutiny is more
deferential.
Justice Marshall has repeatedly contended that means-end scrutiny
is, in general, a sliding scale or a spectrum of intensities of review rather
than a series of discrete tests or tiers.' The intensity of the Court's scru-
tiny, according to Marshall, slides up or down on the basis of at least
three factors: (1) the seriousness of the harm inflicted; (2) the identity of
the group harmed; and (3) the nature of the government interest asserted.
Justice White agrees with Marshall's analysis,45 and anyone who has
42. E.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
647-48 (1981).
43. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). If regulations of elec-
tronic broadcasting restrict communications, the government must satisfy sub-intermediate
scrutiny. E.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984) ("[T]hc restriction
... [must be] narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest .... ").
44. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, the
dissent stated:
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall into
one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict
scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions... defy such easy categori-
zation. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a
spectrum of standards . . . . This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the
degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications ....
Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Other statements of Marshall's sliding scale theory can
be found in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230-31 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Massachu-
setts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); and
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
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studied means-end scrutiny decisions by the Supreme Court would likely
support the analysis-at least in part.
Clearly means-end scrutiny operates as a sliding scale in some con-
texts. An example of sliding-scale means-end scrutiny is the test used in
evaluating impairments of private contracts under the contract clause.46
Means-end scrutiny is used in such cases to evaluate the public need. 7
But the Court has also clearly indicated that the public need is to be
balanced against the severity of the impairment. If the impairment is
slight, the Court uses deferential means-end scrutiny and does not de-
mand a very substantial justification. If the impairment is severe, a
greater public need must be shown, and the Court's scrutiny of the gov-
ernment's ends and means will be stricter.48
e. balancing tests
Indeed, whenever the Court uses a balancing test that involves
weighing the government's need against the harm to the claimant, the
process involves sliding-scale means-end scrutiny. Evaluation of the
need for government action should always involve means-end scrutiny,
since the weight of the public need always depends on the importance of
the government interest, the effectiveness of the means and the availabil-
ity of less onerous alternatives. In balancing need against harm, the
Court must determine the severity of the harm and then decide whether
the need outweighs the harm. If the harm is small, the need does not
have to be great to outweigh the harm. Relatively deferential means-end
scrutiny suffices under these circumstances. If the harm is severe, the
need must be great to outweigh the harm. Therefore, intensified means-
end scrutiny is in order.
An example of the use of means-end scrutiny in applying a balanc-
ing test is New York v. Ferber.49 In that case the Court used a "defini-
tional balancing test"5 to determine whether child pornography is
protected by the first amendment. First, the Court evaluated the public
need, finding that the government interest in protecting the well-being of
children is compelling and that the ban on sales of child pornography is
necessary to dry up the market and eliminate the profit. Second, the
Court evaluated the harm that a ban on child pornography would cause
46. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
47. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
48. Id. at 245.
49. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
50. G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 1097.
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to freedom of expression, finding it "exceedingly modest."'" Because the
need substantially outweighed the harm, the Court upheld the ban.52
To summarize, means-end scrutiny is the analytical test used most
frequently in constitutional cases. It has three components, including
scrutiny of: (1) government interests; (2) effectiveness of means; and
(3) less onerous alternatives. Means-end scrutiny has a variety of levels
or intensities, running from strict scrutiny at the top to the deferential
rational basis test at the bottom. Furthermore, it occurs not only in pure
form but also in combination with other tests and in balancing tests.
The next section discusses problems associated with means-end
scrutiny that deserve attention and possible correction.
B. Problems with Means-End Scrutiny
1. Confusion concerning conceptual structure, components
and terminology
a., restructuring strict scrutiny
An obvious and easily correctable defect in current means-end scru-
tiny is inconsistency in the conceptual structure of the different levels of
intensified scrutiny.53 The gist of the problem is the treatment of the
substantial effectiveness component of strict scrutiny5 4
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that strict
scrutiny is a two-prong test requiring the government to show: (1) a
compelling interest and (2) necessity. Actually strict scrutiny is a three-
prong test requiring: (1) a compelling interest; (2) substantial effective-
ness; and (3) necessity. The Court rarely mentions the substantial effec-
tiveness test, so one has to guess where to locate this prong in the Court's
truncated two-prong formula. Since substantial effectiveness does not fit
comfortably into the concept of necessity, it is more logically placed in
the compelling interest prong.
Conceptually, this is easy. The Court frequently says strict scrutiny
is a two-prong test requiring that the government action (1) further a
51. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
52. Id. at 763-64. Another example of the use of means-end scrutiny in applying a balanc-
ing test is the so-called Pike balancing test used in dormant commerce clause cases. See Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
53. This problem is discussed first because it affects the underlying conceptual structure
and vocabulary of means-end scrutiny. Once it is straightened out, analysis of other problems
becomes easier to articulate.
54. Strict scrutiny clearly does have a substantial effectiveness component. See supra p.
450.
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compelling interest and (2) be necessary." This suggests that the compel-
ling interest prong has two subparts: first, there must be a compelling
interest; second, the government action must further that interest in a
substantially effective manner. In short, the structure of strict scrutiny
becomes:
Strict scrutiny
1. Further a compelling interest, i.e.
a. Compelling interest and
b. Substantially effective and
2. Necessary
At first glance, this seems to get the job done. This formulation recog-
nizes the existence of the substantial effectiveness component of strict
scrutiny and gives it a sensible location in the Court's two-prong test.
However, this solution causes a problem of terminology that casts a
shadow on the vocabulary of means-end scrutiny at its most basic level.
The problem results from locating the substantial effectiveness test in the
first prong of strict scrutiny, which is the prong that seems to involve end
scrutiny. This produces an inconsistency between the conceptual struc-
tures of strict scrutiny and the other forms of intensified scrutiny. Inter-
mediate scrutiny, for example, locates the substantial effectiveness
component in its second prong, which seems to deal with means. Sche-
matically, the inconsistency is as follows:
Strict scrutiny Intermediate scrutiny
1. Serves a compelling interest, i.e. 1. Important interest and
a. Compelling interest and 2. Substantial relation, i.e.
b. Substantially effective and a. Substantially effective and
2. Necessary b. Necessary
Simple aesthetics require that this inconsistency be corrected.
But more than elegance is involved. This particular inconsistency
infects the vocabulary of means-end scrutiny by making it unclear
whether the substantial effectiveness test is part of end scrutiny or means
scrutiny. In strict scrutiny, it seems to be part of end scrutiny; in the
other forms of intensified scrutiny, it is part of means scrutiny. Thus, it
becomes difficult to talk unambiguously about "end scrutiny" and
"means scrutiny." Each term has two different and overlapping
meanings.
More than consistent conceptual structure and vocabulary is at
stake here. The Court's treatment of the substantial effectiveness test in
strict scrutiny has caused confusion in the legal profession. The failure
55. See cases cited supra note 17.
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to acknowledge the existence of this separate test in formal statements of
strict scrutiny tends to make judges and lawyers unaware of its existence
and importance. Moreover, the equivocal treatment of the substantial
effectiveness test obscures the conceptual structure of means-end scru-
tiny, leaving the impression of incoherence and confusion rather than
coherence and clarity.
The solution is surprisingly simple. The Court should explicitly ac-
knowledge the substantial effectiveness component of strict scrutiny and
shift it to the second prong. This would require giving the second prong
a new name, and the obvious candidate would be "substantial relation,"
borrowed from the other forms of intensified scrutiny.
After this cosmetic surgery, strict scrutiny would be articulated as
follows: the government must show that its action is substantially related
to a compelling interest. The substantial relation component would then
have two subparts: (1) substantial effectiveness and (2) necessity. Sche-
matically, the test would be as follows:
Strict scrutiny
1. Compelling interest and
2. Substantial relation, i.e.,
a. Substantially effective and
b. Necessary
Structurally, this would bring strict scrutiny into line with the other
forms of intensified means-end scrutiny.
Another gain would be that "end scrutiny" and "means scrutiny"
would become usable terms again, free from the ambiguity that has
plagued them. End scrutiny would concern scrutiny of the legitimacy
and importance of the government's interest or purpose. Means scrutiny
would concern the effectiveness and necessity of the method chosen. 6
The following chart shows the main levels of means-end scrutiny and
suggests the structural and terminological consistency that emerges from
the change in strict scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny
1. End: compelling interest and
2. Means: substantial relation, i.e.,
a. Substantially effective and
b. Necessary
Intermediate scrutiny
1. End: important interest and
2. Means: substantial relation, i.e.,
56. This definition of "means scrutiny" will be used in the rest of this article.
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a. Substantially effective and
b. Necessary
Sub-intermediate scrutiny
1. End: significant or substantial interest and
2. Means: substantial relation, i.e.,
a. Substantially effective and
b. Necessary
Somewhat heightened scrutiny
1. End: legitimate interest and
2. Means: substantial relation, i.e.,
a. Substantially effective and
b. Necessary
Rationality review
1. End: valid and
2. Means
a. Rational
[b. Not applicable]
b. the enigma of end scrutiny
The Court has clearly indicated that different levels or intensities of
end scrutiny are required in different cases. Thus, strict scrutiny, as nor-
mally articulated, requires the government to show a "compelling" inter-
est. Intermediate scrutiny typically requires an "important" interest.
Some forms of intensified scrutiny require a "substantial" or "signifi-
cant" interest. "Somewhat heightened" scrutiny requires a "legitimate"
interest. Rationality review requires merely a "valid" or "legitimate" in-
terest. Undoubtedly, in many cases, the Court has used these words-
compelling, important, significant, legitimate, etc.-to suggest the appro-
priate intensity of end scrutiny.
The problem is that the Court has been inconsistent, almost cava-
lier, in its use of these words. Sometimes, in describing strict scrutiny,
the Court has used the phrase "important interest" rather than "compel-
ling interest," thus blurring strict and intermediate end scrutiny.57
Sometimes the Court has used "compelling" and "substantial" inter-
changeably in strict scrutiny cases, thus blurring strict and sub-interme-
diate end scrutiny.58 Sometimes the Court has found that an "important
or substantial" interest is needed, thus blurring intermediate and sub-
57. E.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973).
58. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973).
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intermediate scrutiny. 9 Sometimes the Court has even suggested that
these terms are mere "variations in diction" and the words may be used
almost interchangeably. As the Court stated in In re Griffiths,60 "[t]he
state interest required has been characterized as 'overriding,' .... 'impor-
tant,' . . . or 'substantial' . . . We attribute no particular significance to
these variations in diction."'"
This inconsistent use of terminology has caused much confusion.
Admittedly, the words used to describe the levels of end scrutiny are
oversimplifications. Concededly, the levels of end scrutiny tend to be
sliding scales that blend into a single spectrum, as Justice Marshall has
argued. 62 Nevertheless, the Court has an obligation to use words in a
consistent and principled way that allows as much certainty and predict-
ability as possible. Continuous debauching of key phrases such as these
leads to confusion and cynicism.
The Court should settle on a single system for determining the usage
of these descriptive words and adhere to it. Strict end scrutiny should
require a "compelling" or "very important" interest. Intermediate end
scrutiny should require an "important" interest. Bottom tier intensified
scrutiny ("somewhat heightened" scrutiny) should require a "legitimate"
interest. The terms "substantial interest" and "significant interest"
should be defined and assigned to the appropriate level of end scrutiny.
In other words, these differences in diction regarding end scrutiny
are important. They guide the analysis of lower courts and attorneys.
The vocabulary chosen may be somewhat arbitrary, but it should be used
in a consistent manner to eliminate as much ambiguity as possible.
c. the mystery of intensified means scrutiny
A good deal of confusion has been caused by the Court's careless
and inconsistent use of phrases such as "narrowly tailored," "close fit"
and "substantial relation." To give just one example, the concurring
opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 63 mistakenly referred
to " 'narrowly tailored,' or 'substantially related' ,164 as if these two
phrases were synonymous. It would be helpful if the Court would clarify
the meaning of these related but somewhat different concepts and would
59. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
60. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
61. Id. at 722 n.9.
62. See supra p. 460.
63. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
64. Id. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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then use the labels more consistently. The following discussion will ex-
plain their differences.
In order to eliminate the confusion, it is first necessary to have clear
understandings of what these phrases mean. After much initial confu-
sion, the Court appears to have settled the definition of the phrase "nar-
rowly tailored." "Narrowly tailored" now means the same thing as
"necessary." Means are narrowly tailored if they are the least onerous
alternative for furthering the relevant government interest.65
At first glance, one might think that the phrase "close fit" would
mean the same thing as "narrowly tailored." After all, if a suit of clothes
is narrowly tailored it presumably boasts a close fit. But this is not en-
tirely true. Upon careful examination, the phrase "close fit" seems to
have two component meanings. 6 First, of course, "close fit" means that
the government action is narrowly tailored.67 Second, however, "close
fit" means that the government action is substantially effective.68 Means
which are not substantially effective for furthering a government interest
are certainly not "closely fitted" to their objective.
In short, to borrow a figure of speech from equal protection analysis,
close fit requires that the government means be neither substantially un-
derinclusive nor substantially overinclusive. If they are seriously under-
inclusive, they are not substantially effective. If they are seriously
overinclusive, they are not necessary or narrowly tailored. When the
Court uses the phrase "close fit," it should be careful that it is referring
to both effectiveness and necessity.
The phrase "substantial relationship" suffers from similar uncertain-
ties. As previously stated,69 it was initially unclear whether the phrase
referred to both substantial effectiveness and necessity or only to substan-
tial effectiveness. Later cases have indicated that the "substantial rela-
tionship" test includes both components., Therefore, the phrase has the
same meaning as "close fit," and should not be used as a synonym for
65. See, e.g., id., 106 S. Ct. at 1850 n.6 (1986), which states: "[t]he term 'narrowly tai-
lored,' so frequently used in our cases, has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically,
as commentators have indicated, the term may be used to require consideration of whether
lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used." Id.
But see supra note 26 regarding the Court's confusing language on this point in the recent
Ragland case.
66. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2977-78
(1986).
67. Id. (legislature did not prohibit advertising for all games of chance but restricted only
casino gambling).
68. Id. at 2977 ("challenged restrictions on commercial speech 'directly advances' the gov-
ernment's asserted interest.").
69. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
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"narrowly tailored," a phrase which refers only to the necessity
component.
d. sorting out the substantial effectiveness test
Several problems exist with the substantial effectiveness component
of intensified means-end scrutiny. Two problems have been discussed
above: (1) the failure to articulate the test clearly, especially in strict
scrutiny cases, and (2) the treatment of the substantial effectiveness test
as part of the "end" component of strict scrutiny.7" The purpose of this
section is to point out some other problems that deserve solutions.
i. undue deference and sliding scales
Clearly the different levels of intensified scrutiny call for different
intensities of end scrutiny: compelling, important, substantial, signifi-
cant, legitimate, etc. It is far from clear, however, whether the other two
components of intensified scrutiny are to be applied in a single consistent
fashion or, like end scrutiny, are variable in their intensity. Clarification
is needed on this point.
Past cases seem to suggest that the substantial effectiveness compo-
nent of intensified scrutiny is the same for all levels of review from strict
scrutiny down to somewhat heightened scrutiny. Thus, the "substantial
relationship" test used in intermediate scrutiny cases involving gender-
based classifications and in somewhat heightened scrutiny cases involv-
ing illegitimacy classifications apparently involves the same substantial
effectiveness requirement that is the standard in strict scrutiny cases.
But are these tests really the same? In some cases, the Court has
applied the substantial effectiveness test in a deferential, nonaggressive
manner. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., for ex-
ample, the Court suggested that the "directly advances" test for commer-
cial speech handed down in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission 7 2 is satisfied whenever the legislative judg-
ment regarding effectiveness is " 'not manifestly unreasonable.' ,7 Ap-
plying this deferential test, the Court concluded:
Step three asks the question whether the challenged restrictions
on commercial speech "directly advance" the government's as-
serted interest. In the instant case, the answer to this question
70. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
71. 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986).
72. 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
73. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2977 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 509 (1981) (White, J., plurality opinion)).
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is clearly "yes." The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously be-
lieved, when it enacted the advertising restrictions at issue here,
that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of
Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the prod-
uct advertised. We think the legislature's belief is a reasonable
one .... 74
Similarly, the Court in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
71
evaluated a place regulation of adult theaters and applied the substantial
effectiveness test as if it were rationality review. The Court stated:
Cities may regulate adult theaters by dispersing them, as in De-
troit, or by effectively concentrating them, as in Renton. "It is
not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the city's] decision
to require adult theaters to be separated .... [T]he city must
be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solu-
tions to admittedly serious problems."
76
The deferential version of the substantial effectiveness test has been
used mainly in cases involving sub-intermediate scrutiny. Does this
mean that the substantial effectiveness test is to be applied in a more
deferential manner in cases involving levels of intensified scrutiny lower
than intermediate and strict scrutiny? The Court has not answered this
question.
Examination of the Court's episodic lapses into deferential versions
of intensified means scrutiny leads one to believe that the Court does, in
fact, apply the substantial effectiveness test in a less demanding, more
deferential manner in cases involving forms of intensified scrutiny lower
on the scale than intermediate scrutiny. One would certainly hope, at a
minimum, that the kinds of roll-over, casual means scrutiny that have
characterized some recent intensified scrutiny cases will not be adopted
in strict and intermediate scrutiny cases.
The Court should clarify this issue by explaining whether the sub-
stantial effectiveness test is the same in all cases or whether it is to be
applied more deferentially in some cases. If the latter is true, the Court
should establish guidelines for determining when greater deference is
required.
ii. renaming the Central Hudson "directly advances" test
The Court has adopted a sub-intermediate version of intensified
74. Id.
75. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
76. Id. at 52 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976)).
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scrutiny for first amendment cases involving commercial speech. The
locus classicus of the test is Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission , in which the Court held that commercial speech
may be regulated if the regulation "directly advances" a "substantial in-
terest" and is the least onerous alternative available.7" The Court's opin-
ion makes it clear that the language "directly advances" means the same
thing as the substantially effective means test used in other forms of in-
tensified scrutiny. Indeed, Central Hudson contains some of the Court's
clearest language on the meaning of the substantial effectiveness test.79
Several problems exist with the Court's use of the "directly ad-
vances" terminology to describe its commercial speech test. First, the
Court does not explain that this test is the same as the substantial effec-
tiveness test used in other versions of means-end scrutiny. This lack of
explanation gives the false impression that the test is different in some
way and casts doubt on what the substantial effectiveness test actually
means. Second, the use of two different names for the same test creates
confusion and prevents judges and lawyers from perceiving clearly that
the tests are indeed the same.
Third, the linguistic focus on whether the means "directly" further
the government interest misdirects the inquiry and carries undesirable
historical baggage. The question should be whether the means are sub-
stantially effective, not whether the effect is direct or indirect. Pre-1937
commerce clause cases used a test that focused on whether the effect of a
local activity on interstate commerce was direct or indirect.80 This test
proved to be unhelpful and unworkable, and it was discarded by the
Court after the constitutional revolution of 1937.81 The modern position
in commerce clause cases has been that the logical structure of the causal
chain-whether the effect is direct (immediate) or indirect (mediated
through some intervening cause)-is not the key question. Rather the
correct focus is on whether the actual, pragmatic effect is substantial.
The same insight is applicable to the effectiveness prong of means-end
scrutiny: the key question is not whether the means chosen advance the
government interest directly; it is whether the means chosen are substan-
77. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
78. Id. at 564.
79. For example, the Court stated, "[f]irst, the restriction must directly advance the state
interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote
support for the government's purpose." Id.
80. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
81. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 US. 100
(1941).
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tially effective, regardless of whether that effectiveness is achieved di-
rectly or indirectly.
In short, the Court should declare that the Central Hudson "directly
advances" test is identical with the substantial effectiveness test used in
other means-end scrutiny cases and rename it accordingly. This declara-
tion would clear up the confusion resulting from the use of inconsistent
names for the test. It would focus the lower courts' attention on the
proper reasoning in commercial speech cases. In addition, since Central
Hudson ironically provides the Court's clearest explanation of what the
substantial effectiveness test means, it would help to clarify the existence
and operation of that test for other cases.
Of course, if the Court intends the Central Hudson "directly ad-
vances" test to mean something different from the substantial effective-
ness test, then it should say so and eliminate the confusion.
e. nailing down the necessity requirement
The Court has caused confusion by applying the necessity (narrowly
tailored, least onerous alternative) component of intensified scrutiny in
an inconsistent manner. The inconsistency concerns at least two compo-
nents of the test.
i. must alternatives be "equally effective"?
Early versions of the least onerous alternative test suggested that,
where the test is applicable, the government must prove the nonexistence
of less restrictive alternatives that would advance the government's inter-
ests in a substantially effective manner.82 The Court did not require that
less restrictive alternatives be equally effective in order to qualify for con-
sideration. Recent cases, in contrast, suggest that less restrictive alterna-
tives need not be used by the government unless they are equally
effective. 3 The Court should clarify this ambiguity. The better ap-
proach would be to continue the old rule requiring the government to use
substantially effective less restrictive alternatives even if they are not
100% as effective. The "equally effective alternatives" version would re-
sult in too great an erosion of the necessity requirement.
82. E.g., Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
83. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2978 ("as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling
as a restriction on advertising"); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675. 689 (1985) ("'[A]n
incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential ... so long as the neutral regulation
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.").
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ii. the role of deference
Traditionally, it was understood that courts should exercise in-
dependent judgment concerning whether less restrictive alternatives are
available for advancing the government's interests. The government had
the burden of proof and was required to persuade the court that no less
restrictive alternative existed. Some recent cases, in contrast, indicate
that courts should defer to the judgment of other branches of govern-
ment on the issue whether less restrictive alternatives would suffice.8 4 In
other words, if the government rejects an allegedly less restrictive alter-
native because it would not accomplish the desired task, courts should
accept that decision and uphold the government action.85
If this new deferential version of the least onerous alternative test
were widely adopted, the result would be a dangerous weakening of in-
tensified means scrutiny. This would be especially true if the Court were
to adopt both the "equally effective" and "deferential" versions of the
necessity requirement. If only equally effective alternatives need be con-
sidered and if courts are required to defer to the government's conclu-
sions that alternatives are not equally effective, then the least onerous
alternative test will lose its bite and cease to function as a meaningful
restraint on government infringements of constitutional rights.
8 6
The least onerous alternative test has been perhaps the most impor-
tant and restrictive ingredient of intensified means-end scrutiny. The test
has probably been decisive in striking down unconstitutional government
action more often than the other two components of intensified scrutiny
84. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689 ("The validity of such regulations does not turn on a judge's
agreement with the responsible decision-maker concerning the most appropriate method for
promoting significant government interests."); see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). In Clark, the Court stated:
We do not believe, however, that either United States v. O'Brien or the time, place, or
manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as
the manager of the Nation's parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to
judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation
is to be attained.
Id. at 299.
85. As the Court put it in Posadas:
Appellant contends, however, that the First Amendment requires the Puerto Rico
Legislature to reduce demand for casino gambling.., not by suppressing commercial
speech that might encourage such gambling, but by promulgating additional speech
designed to discourage it. We reject this contention. We think it is up to the legisla-
ture to decide whether or not such a "counterspeech" policy would be as effective in
reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising. The legisla-
ture could conclude, as it apparently did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are al-
ready aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by
widespread advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct.
106 S. Ct. at 2978 (emphasis in original).
86. E.g., Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41.
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combined. It is crucial that courts be authorized to exercise independent
judgment regarding alternatives and that the Court eliminate the new
deferential version of the test or at least rigidly confine the test to limited
classes of cases. 7
f pro forma means-end scrutiny
Taken to its extreme, the deferential kind of "intensified" means-end
scrutiny that has emerged in recent years can degenerate into mere in-
cantations or ritualistic verbal formulas recited by the courts while pre-
siding over the burial of constitutional liberties. A classic example is
Playtime Theatres. 88 The Renton ordinance at issue confined theaters
showing constitutionally protected, non-obscene, adult films to a small
industrial area of the city. This triggered the intermediate presumption
of unconstitutionality applicable to content-neutral time, place and man-
ner regulations of expression.89 Thus, the burden was on the city to show
that its ordinance was a substantially effective and necessary means to
serve a substantial government interest. Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion upholding the ordinance made a mockery of the concept of in-
tensified scrutiny. According to Justice Rehnquist, "[i]t is clear that the
ordinance meets such a standard."9 In marching to this foregone con-
clusion, Justice Rehnquist ran roughshod over each of the three prongs
of intensified scrutiny.
The substantial government interest, according to Justice Rehn-
quist, was the "'interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban
87. To date, the Court has not explained in a systematic manner when judges should and
should not defer to other branches. The Court has suggested that judicial review should be
more deferential, for example, in cases involving military, tax and zoning matters, but addi-
tional and much more specific guidelines are needed.
88. 475 U.S. 41.
89. The conclusion that the restriction was content-neutral was extremely dubious, since
the ordinance was explicitly limited to theaters showing adult films and, therefore, seemed to
be facially subject-matter based. Justice Rehnquist managed to avoid the strong presumption
of unconstitutionality applicable to content-based infringements of free expression by invoking
a highly questionable "secondary effects" test, which converts content-based infringements
into content-neutral infringements when the government's purpose is to deal with the secon-
dary effects of speech rather than to suppress the speech because of its content. Id. at 48-50.
This unprecedented use of secondary effects analysis to circumvent strict scrutiny is one of the
most radical and dangerous developments in first amendment analysis in several decades, one
which, if taken to its logical conclusion, could eliminate so-called "track one" first amendment
analysis and reduce the usual first amendment test from strict to sub-intermediate scrutiny. It
is critical that the Court confine the Playthne Theatres secondary effects test to disfavored
speech cases such as Playtime Theatres and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 (1976), the case in which the test originated.
90. 475 U.S. at 50.
January 1988]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:449
life,' "91 an interest so diffuse as to cover virtually anything a city might
choose to require. Moreover, the interest was sufficient even though
Renton had absolutely no experience with adult theaters and was relying
entirely on evidence concerning other cities. By declaring such a nebu-
lous government interest "substantial" without any specific evidence,
Justice Rehnquist virtually nullified the end scrutiny component of sub-
intermediate scrutiny. But that was only the start.
Turning to means scrutiny, Justice Rehnquist decimated the sub-
stantial effectiveness test by declaring, "'[i]t is not our function to ap-
praise the wisdom of [the city's] decision to require adult theaters to be
... concentrated in the same areas .... [T]he city must be allowed a
reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly seri-
ous problems.' "92 This is the language of rationality review rather than
intensified scrutiny, and this language makes a sham of the notion that
sub-intermediate scrutiny requires heightened scrutiny of the effective-
ness of the means.
Finally, Justice Rehnquist brushed aside the least onerous alterna-
tive requirement with the following single, conclusory sentence:
"[m]oreover, the Renton ordinance is 'narrowly tailored' to affect only
that category of theaters shown to produce the unwanted secondary ef-
fects .... .". This is mere pronouncement, not analysis.
Such pro forma means-end scrutiny can only have a demoralizing
effect on American constitutional law. Intensified means-end scrutiny is
supposed to be a serious, stringent, searching form of analysis designed to
test whether, in fact, the government can show a weighty countervailing
justification sufficient to outweigh the infringement of constitutional
rights and overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality. The Court
should never hold that intensified scrutiny is met unless it can articulate a
persuasive argument, based on evidence of record, that the action is a
substantially effective and necessary method for furthering a serious in-
terest. Formalistic, ritualized means-end scrutiny that merely recites
conclusions along the way to a pre-ordained result degrades the entire
process of constitutional analysis and encourages lower court judges to
treat means-end scrutiny as a mere verbal formula that provides rational-
izations for results reached on other unexpressed grounds.
91. Id. (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976)).
92. Id. at 52 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976)).
93. Id.
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2. Trouble in the tiers94
a. slippery slopes at the top: the softening of strict scrutiny
At one time, strict scrutiny was roughly synonymous with "you
can't do it." Strict scrutiny was "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact
... ,95 In recent years, however, the Court has softened the strict scru-
tiny test considerably. To the Burger Court, strict scrutiny often seemed
to mean, "You can do it if you're careful."
This is a dangerous development. Strict scrutiny is the test used by
the Court to enforce some of the most basic constitutional limits such as
the presumption against racial classifications disfavoring minorities and
the presumption against content-based restrictions and prior restraints
on publication. The erosion of strict scrutiny threatens to weaken these
fundamental constitutional protections.
The recent softening of strict scrutiny has affected each of the three
components of that test, as the following sections will explain.
i. proliferation of compelling interests
Until the Burger era, the Supreme Court was extremely reluctant to
find government interests sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny.
To be sure, a few exceptions existed. The Court recognized the interest
in avoiding major military disasters as compelling. 96 Similarly, the inter-
est in protecting the nation from communist subversion was considered
sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.97 But the list was short.
In recent years, however, the Court has been surprisingly willing to
characterize government interests as compelling. Government purposes
which are admittedly legitimate and even substantial but seem far less
urgent than avoiding major military catastrophes have been labeled com-
pelling. Increasingly, the Justices add new interests to the list in a casual,
off-hand manner suggesting that they believe that almost 'any significant
government interest is sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny.
Here are some examples. Having a uniform day of rest has been
identified as a sufficient interest to satisfy strict scrutiny.9" The fact that,
94. The discussion now turns from problems regarding means-end scrutiny generally to
problems regarding specific "levels" of means-end scrutiny from strict scrutiny down to
rationality review.
95. Gunther, supra note 11, at 8.
96. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.. 214 (1944); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931) (dictum).
97. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961); cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
98. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963) (dictum).
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after roughly the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, abortion is
somewhat more life-threatening than childbirth has been held to provide
a compelling interest sufficient to support restrictions on the constitu-
tional right to an abortion.9 9 In one case, the Court suggested, "[t]he
State's interest in fair and effective utility regulation may be compel-
ling.""'° In another, the Court indicated generally that protecting the
interests of minor children is a compelling interest. 0 ' The purpose "to
limit the actuality and appearance of corruption" has been found suffi-
ciently compelling to justify limits on contributions to federal candi-
dates."10 Remedying prior discrimination is a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify explicit racial preferences.10 3 In several cases, the
Court has actually given laundry lists of new compelling interests. In
one instance, for example, the Court listed "extirpating the traffic in ille-
gal drugs," "preventing the community from being disrupted by violent
disorders" and "forestalling assassination attempts" as compelling
interests. t°4
Several Justices have played leading roles in watering down the con-
cept of compelling interests. Justice Powell has contributed substantially
to the softening of the compelling interest test, especially by repeatedly
using the words compelling, important, substantial and significant as if
they were virtually synonymous. 0 5 Justice O'Connor uses the label very
loosely. For example, she holds the opinion that preventing almost any
serious crime is a compelling interest. 0 6
The Burger Court's eagerness to expand the list of compelling inter-
ests has resulted in a serious debasement of the compelling interest test,
severely eroding the strictness of strict scrutiny.
ii. erosion of the substantial effectiveness test
The erosion of traditional strict scrutiny is also apparent when one
considers the Court's enforcement of the substantial effectiveness require-
99. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986).
101. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
103. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. 1842; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
104. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700-01 (1972).
105. Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722 n.9.
106. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 796 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("the
compelling public interest in punishing crimes"); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1. 27 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Because burglary is a serious crime and dangerous felony, the
public interest in the prevention and detection of the crime is of compelling importance.").
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ment. Increasingly, the Court has adopted a deferential posture on this
issue that belies its claim that it is using strict scrutiny.
An example is Roe v. Wade,' °7 the landmark abortion case. After
discovering the noninterpretive constitutional right to have an abortion
and declaring that restrictions on the right must be narrowly drawn to
further a compelling interest, the Court proceeded to apply strict scru-
tiny to the regulations at issue. The Court posited that the interest in
protecting the mother's health becomes compelling at the end of the first
trimester of pregnancy. Then, in a classic non sequitur, it asserted, "[i]t
follows that, from and after this point, a state may regulate the abortion
procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the pres-
ervation and protection of maternal health."
' 10 8
Of course, it did not follow from prior cases that strict scrutiny can
be satisfied by "reasonable" regulations. To the contrary, strict scrutiny
requires that the means be substantially and demonstrably effective in
furthering the interest in maternal health. The surprising and unex-
plained lapse from strict scrutiny into rationality review illustrates the
Burger Court's tendency to apply the substantial effectiveness component
of strict scrutiny in a softened manner.
Buckley v. Valeo 9 is another example. Among the many claims
plaintiffs brought, they challenged a Federal Election Campaign Act pro-
vision requiring disclosure of the names of persons contributing $10 or
more to federal candidates. The asserted government interest was to pre-
vent actual or apparent corruption. Chief Justice Burger's dissent
pointed out, "[t]o argue that a 1976 contribution of $10 ... entails a risk
of corruption ... is simply too extravagant to be maintained .... There
is, in short, no relation whatever between the means used and the legiti-
mate goal of ventilating possible undue influence."' 10 Nevertheless, the
Court upheld the disclosure requirement, adopting a posture far more
deferential than normally characteristic of strict scrutiny.
Another case suggesting a relaxed, lenient approach to the substan-
tial effectiveness requirement is Snepp v. United States,"' in which the
Court upheld a pre-publication clearance requirement as a "reasonable"
means to further the compelling interest in preserving secrecy of CIA
activities.' 12
107. 410 U.S. 113.
108. Id. at 163.
109. 424 U.S. 1.
110. Id. at 239.
111. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
112. Id. at 511-12.
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iii. least onerous alternative test
Finally, the Court has adopted an increasingly deferential posture
with regard to the "least onerous alternative" requirement. The Buckley
v. Valeo ruling concerning disclosure of $10 campaign contributions is
illustrative. Clearly a less onerous alternative for preventing actual and
apparent corruption was available there, namely use of a higher thresh-
old for required disclosure.
As stated above, the government traditionally had the burden to
prove the nonexistence of less restrictive alternatives that would allow it
to achieve its goal in a reasonably effective manner. Recently, the Court
has begun to modify this requirement in two crucial ways. 111 First, it has
indicated that the government need not consider or use less restrictive
alternatives unless they are "equally effective." Second, the Court has
instructed lower courts that -they must defer to the judgment of the other
branches of government regarding whether alternatives are equally effec-
tive. If these modifications are applied in strict scrutiny cases, the neces-
sity requirement will all but disappear. 114
The erosion of the necessity requirement is extremely dangerous.
The least onerous alternative test has been the component of strict scru-
tiny with the most bite. The requirement that the government use the
alternative that has the least adverse impact on constitutional rights has
arguably been the courts' strongest weapon in the enforcement of civil
liberties. The Court's new deferential version of alternatives analysis
threatens to eliminate this prong of strict scrutiny almost entirely.
If courts are bound by the findings of other government agencies
that less restrictive alternatives are not equally effective, those agencies
will be able to insulate their infringements of constitutional rights from
judicial review by merely finding that alternatives will not work as well.
It is crucial that the burden be kept on the government to prove the
nonexistence of less restrictive alternatives and that the courts continue
to make independent judgments regarding the effectiveness of such
alternatives.
iv. "strict" scrutiny in free exercise cases
The softened version of strict scrutiny that has emerged in recent
years has been especially evident in cases involving the free exercise of
113. See supra pp. 471-73.
114. Admittedly, the modifications have emerged in sub-intermediate scrutiny cases rather
than strict scrutiny cases, so the possibility is open that the Court will not apply its modified
test in cases involving strict scrutiny.
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religion clause." 5 Early cases interpreting the clause suggested that the
government may not punish or seek to compel religious belief but that
the government's power to regulate religiously motivated or proscribed
action was much greater." 6 Indeed, it appeared that the government
need only survive rationality review to satisfy the clause in cases involv-
ing action rather than belief. This changed dramatically in Sherbert v.
Verner," 7 which held that government restrictions on religiously moti-
vated conduct are subject to strict scrutiny. 118
The Sherbert strict scrutiny test has been applied in many later free
exercise cases and is still theoretically controlling today. But systematic
reading of the cases suggests that the scrutiny used in free exercise cases
is far less strict than in cases involving issues such as race discrimination
and prior restraints on publications. Indeed, the "strict" scrutiny used in
free exercise cases is rather easy to satisfy. For example, the Court has
indicated that society's interest in a uniform day of rest is sufficiently
compelling to justify requiring orthodox Jews to close their stores on
Sundays. 9 The Court has also rejected a free exercise challenge by the
Amish to mandatory participation in the Social Security program be-
cause "mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of
the social security system."' 2° Similarly, the Court has rejected a claim
that the free exercise clause permits a religious college to discriminate on
the basis of race, holding that the interest in eradicating discrimination in
education is sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.'
2'
Cases such as these suggest that free exercise scrutiny is actually
more akin to intermediate scrutiny than to strict scrutiny. Apparently
the Court went too far in Sherbert, leaping all the way from rationality
review to strict scrutiny. To allow exemptions from general laws when-
ever an individual objects to a legal prohibition or requirement on reli-
gious grounds simply creates an unacceptably large loophole in the law.
Recognizing this, the Court has continued in many cases to allow gov-
ernment regulation of religiously motivated action.
The problem with this approach is that it undermines the concept of
strict scrutiny. By applying a watered down, "intermediate" version of
strict scrutiny in free exercise cases, the Court gives the impression that
strict scrutiny is a test that is easy to satisfy. By failing to indicate that
115. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
116. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
117. 374 U.S. 398.
118. Id. at 406.
119. Id. at 408; cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
120. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982).
121. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
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strict scrutiny in free exercise cases is different from strict scrutiny in
other areas, the Court encourages judges to use a similarly watered-down
version of strict scrutiny in other areas as well.
The solution is rather simple. The Supreme Court should change
the test in free exercise cases from strict to intermediate scrutiny.1
22
That would allow courts to uphold government restrictions on religiously
motivated conduct without impairing strict scrutiny as a means for con-
trolling government infringements of other constitutional rights that the
Court is more serious about enforcing. The Court should reserve the
strict scrutiny test for constitutional limits that are intended to function
as nearly absolute bans, not cheapen the test by using it in areas where
the Court intends to allow substantial government regulation.
The erosion of the three prongs of strict scrutiny is an unfortunate
development. Strict scrutiny was initially adopted as a substitute for ab-
solute constitutional bans. Most Justices accepted Frankfurter's conclu-
sion that constitutional limits are not absolute and that constitutional
interests must be accommodated when they conflict. Strict scrutiny is a
method for determining when a constitutional interest is outweighed by a
countervailing interest that is entitled to prevail in a particular case. But
strict scrutiny, in its initial formulations, was clearly intended to function
almost as a ban: exceptions were to be allowed only on rare occasions
where the countervailing interest was truly overwhelming. By watering
down strict scrutiny, the Court reduces fundamental constitutional limits
to mere admonitions which can be ignored whenever the government of-
fers any substantial justification. Going back to treating constitutional
limits as absolutes would be better than allowing them to be discarded so
easily.
In short, strict scrutiny should be toughened up considerably, and
the Court should put a stop to the progressive erosion that has occurred
during the last two decades.
b. muddle in the middle: confusion concerning intermediate scrutiny
The intermediate tier of means-end scrutiny has been surrounded by
confusion ever since it was first introduced in the 1976 case of Craig v.
Boren.'23 This confusion has concerned the meaning of the terms the
122. The retreat from strict scrutiny in free exercise cases may have begun already in cases
such as Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (strict scrutiny not applicable to government action
uniformly denying benefits); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 693 (1986) (strict scrutiny not
applicable in the context of military discipline).
123. 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see Seeburger, The Muddle of the Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis
in Equal Protection, 48 Mo. L. REV. 587 (1983).
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Court used to describe the test, the precise components of the test, the
intensity of the means-end scrutiny mandated by the test, and whether
intermediate scrutiny is one test or several related tests. Clarification is
needed in order to enable judges and attorneys to understand and apply
intermediate scrutiny in a consistent manner.
i. meaning of terms and components of the test
As initially formulated and later reconfirmed, intermediate scrutiny
requires that the government action be "substantially related" to an "im-
portant government interest."' 24 Both these terms need clarification.
What is an "important government interest?" The general consen-
sus is that the phrase means something less than the kind of compelling
government interest required to satisfy strict scrutiny.'25 Beyond that,
however, confusion exists. This confusion arises from the Court's refusal
to adopt a consistent vocabulary for end scrutiny. At times, the Court
has indicated that, to qualify as "important," the interest must be more
weighty than the kind of "substantial" or "significant" interest required
by lesser versions of intensified scrutiny. At other times, however, the
Court has used "important, .... substantial" and "significant" as if they
were synonyms.
The more important source of confusion concerns the meaning of
"substantial relation."'2 6 In the early cases, the meaning of the term
seemed identical with "substantially effective." Under this definition,
means would be substantially related to an end if they were substantially
effective in achieving that end. Later cases suggested, however, that the
substantial relation test also has a "least onerous alternative"
requirement.
27
The Justices appear to be divided on this point. One group, led by
Justice O'Connor, has asserted that intermediate scrutiny does contain a
least onerous alternative component and has struck down laws on that
basis.'28 The other group, led by Chief Jusiice Rehnquist, has taken the
position that intermediate scrutiny does not involve a least onerous alter-
native requirement.12 9 The former is certainly the better view, and the
124. See supra p. 455-56.
125. This consensus exists in spite of the Court's occasional statements implying that "com-
pelling" and "important" interests are synonymous.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
127. See cases cited supra note 25.
128. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) ("In sum, the record
in this case is flatly inconsistent with the claim that excluding men from the School of Nursing
is necessary to reach any of MUW's educational goals.").
129. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) ("It is argued that
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Court should clearly indicate in future cases that intermediate scrutiny
does include a least onerous alternative component.
ii. intensity of the test
The Justices also appear to be divided about the nature of intermedi-
ate scrutiny. Is it an intense, aggressive form of means-end scrutiny like
strict scrutiny, or a mild, deferential form of scrutiny more like rational-
ity review?
1 30
The prevailing view at present seems to be that intermediate scru-
tiny is a demanding type of means-end scrutiny comparable to strict
scrutiny, at least in sex discrimination cases. Thus, for example, a recent
majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan 131 states that intermediate scrutiny requires the gov-
ernment to show an "exceedingly persuasive justification."' 32 The opin-
ion, however, only mustered five votes.
The remaining Justices, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, are more
inclined to view intermediate scrutiny as a relaxed, deferential form of
means-end scrutiny. This posture was evident in several sex discrimina-
tion cases decided in the years before the Hogan case. 133 Moreover, it
has been strongly reinforced by the Court's recent opinion in Playtime
Theatres. 1
34
If the type of scrutiny exemplified by the Playtime Theatres case
becomes normative, intermediate scrutiny will cease to be a major re-
straint on government action. Of course, Playtime Theatres involved a
place restriction on speech rather than a gender-based classification, so
perhaps Rehnquist's "roll over and belly up" version of means-end scru-
tiny will be restricted to sub-intermediate scrutiny cases. Certainly, clari-
fication is needed regarding whether the Hogan or Playtime Theatres
form of intermediate scrutiny is to be used in future cases.
iii. one test or several?
The foregoing discussion suggests another ambiguity regarding in-
termediate scrutiny: is it one test, or does it have several different ver-
sions in different contexts? Intermediate scrutiny originated in equal
this statute is not necessary to deter teenage pregnancy because a gender-neutral statute...
would serve that goal equally well. The relevant inquiry, however, is not whether the statute is
drawn as precisely as it might have been ... " (emphasis in original)).
130. See Seeburger, supra note 123.
131. 458 U.S. 718.
132. Id. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
133. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M., 450 U.S. 464.
134. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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protection cases involving sex discrimination, but similar tests have sub-
sequently been adopted in other areas of law including free speech (time,
place and manner regulations; commercial speech; restrictions on com-
munications by electronic broadcasting media; etc.), dormant commerce
clause (discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce), privileges and
immunities clause, and others. In all of these cases, the Court has used
language suggesting that the government must show that its action is
substantially related to an important or significant government interest.
But are these forms of intensified scrutiny really identical, or does
the Court intend that they be different in their intensity and/or compo-
nents? The answer is unknown at this time and must await further clari-
fication by the Court-clarification that is needed to restore certainty to
these important areas of constitutional law.
In short, fundamental uncertainties exist with regard to the struc-
ture and intensity of intermediate scrutiny. One can only hope that the
Court will provide further guidelines in future cases.
c. bite at the bottom: problems with nondeferential rationality review
Rationality review, which occupies the bottom of the scale of
means-end scrutiny, has had a checkered historical career that remains
very unsettled today. The structure of rationality review was already set-
tled in the 1800's: (1) a valid government interest (end scrutiny), plus
(2) a rational method for furthering the interest (means scrutiny). In the
pre-1937 period, the Court conducted rationality review in an aggressive,
nondeferential manner, nullifying many economic reform laws that
struck the Justices as irrational.' 35 After the constitutional revolution of
1937, the Court backed off, adopting the deferential rational basis test, a
hands-off version that resulted in virtually automatic rejections of due
process and equal protection claims in socio-economic cases.' 36 The def-
erence was so extreme during the Warren era that a leading scholar la-
beled rationality review "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none
in fact."
137
Since 1970, however, the Court has reactivated the nondeferential
version of rationality review. Instead of simply asking whether a rational
person could conclude that the government action serves some conceiva-
ble government interest, the Court began, in some cases, to demand proof
that the government action is a demonstrably effective method for fur-
135. E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905).
136. E.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
137. Gunther, supra note 11, at 8.
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thering an actual, valid government interest. The merits of this "ration-
ality review with a bite" have been debated at length.' 38 Perhaps it is a
good idea. But the Court's use of nondeferential rationality review has
created some problems.
i. unpredictability and uncertainty
Although reactivated in the 1970's, nondeferential rationality review
remains the exception rather than the general rule. In most cases involv-
ing rationality review, the Court uses the deferential rational basis test
and upholds the government action without difficulty. Occasionally,
however, the Justices use intensified rationality review and strike down
the government action, finding that the government has no actual valid
interest or that the means are not demonstrably effective. The problem is
that the Court has not formulated any clear guidelines for predicting
when the activist, nondeferential version of rationality review will be
used. That leaves lower court judges and attorneys guessing. One never
knows whether rationality review should be performed deferentially or
nondeferentially.
The Court should help dispel this confusion by identifying the fac-
tors that justify the use of nondeferential rationality review. Past deci-
sions in which the Court has used rationality review to strike down
government action suggest that three factors play a role in heightening
the scrutiny. First, the nature of the harm inflicted is important: when
the harm is severe-even though not an infringement of a fundamental
right-the Court is more inclined to use nondeferential rationality re-
view. "'39 Second, the identity of the persons harmed has been a major
factor in several cases. 40 Third, judicial displeasure with the govern-
ment's purpose may result in heightened rationality review. 41 Past cases
suggest that these factors need not all be present to trigger nondeferential
rationality review; each, if present, nudges the Court away from its nor-
mal hands-off posture.
ii. confusion concerning burden of proof
The emergence of nondeferential rationality review has created fur-
138. Id.
139. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (exclusion from public education); USDA v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (denial of food stamps).
140. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (develop-
mentally disabled persons); Plyer, 457 U.S. 202 (children of undocumented aliens); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (short-term state citizens).
141. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (purpose to protect local
businesses); Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (purpose to harm "hippies").
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ther confusion concerning allocation of the burden of proof. Earlier
cases applied a simple, clear rule for allocating the burden of proof: if
intensified scrutiny was applicable, the government had the burden of
proof on the issue of justification; if rationality review was applicable, the
challenger had the burden of proof. Unfortunately, as a result of recent
cases, this clarity has vanished.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 142 illustrates the
new state of confusion. At issue was a government classification disfa-
voring developmentally disabled (mentally retarded) persons. The Court
rejected a spirited contention that the classification should be declared
suspect and held that rationality review was applicable.143 Surprisingly,
the Court then struck down the classification, holding that rationality
review was not satisfied since the record did not contain evidence show-
ing that the differential treatment of developmentally disabled persons
was rational."4
The notion that government action should be declared unconstitu-
tional under the rational relation test unless the record contains evidence
justifying the use of the classification effectively puts the burden of proof
on the government. Certainly the challenger is not going to introduce
the required evidence into the record; if the government does not go for-
ward with evidence justifying its action, it will lose. This de facto shift of
the burden of proof to the government is contrary to prior cases which
placed the burden on the challenger. In the aftermath of the Cleburne
case, it is unclear where the burden of proof lies, and clarification is
needed.
iii. blurring the line between rationality review and
intensified scrutiny
The new confusion concerning allocation of the burden of proof is
symptomatic of a more general confusion that now exists regarding the
boundary between rationality review and intensified scrutiny. What is
the difference between the nondeferential rational relation test and the
"somewhat heightened scrutiny" at the bottom of the intensified scrutiny
scale? Is the Cleburne version of rationality review-which Justice Mar-
shall labeled " 'second order' rational basis review" 11a-different from
142. 473 U.S. 432.
143. Id. at 442.
144. In Cleburne, the Court stated: "[b]ecause in our view the record does not reveal any
rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the
city's legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance inva-
lid . I..." d. at 448.
145. Id. at 471 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the low level intensified scrutiny involved in illegitimacy cases such as
Mills v. Habluetzel ?146 At present, the answer is unclear.
The blurring of the boundary between rationality review and intensi-
fied scrutiny is epitomized by Plyler v. Doe,147 which invoked a "further-
ing a substantial interest" test,14 8 dubbed it " 'intermediate' scrutiny,"'
49
and cited in support Craig v. Boren,1 50 an intermediate scrutiny case, and
Lalli v. Lalli,51 ' a "somewhat heightened" scrutiny case. By citing Craig
and Lalli as authorities for a single standard of review, the Court blurred
the demarcation that separated what were thought to be two different
types of intensified means-end scrutiny. The Court further confused the
issue by stating that the challenged law "can hardly be considered ra-
tional unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State,"15 2 thus merg-
ing intensified scrutiny and rationality review.
Perhaps the Court is saying that there is no meaningful difference
between the most intense forms of rationality review and the least intense
forms of intensified scrutiny and that, indeed, a sliding scale or gradual
spectrum exists at the bottom of the means-end scrutiny scale. If so,
judges and lawyers can adjust accordingly. But the Court should give
some clear signals on this point to avoid a state of total confusion about
the structure, intensity and burden of proof in cases of this nature.
iv. encouraging judicial activism
The point of the deferential rational basis test was to prevent judges
from substituting their own views of what is rational for those of the
legislators and administrators who make the rules. A danger involved in
resurrecting the activist, nondeferential rational relation test is that
judges will once again begin enjoining the government from governing in
the socio-economic arena when they disagree with what the government
is doing. This problem will be discussed further below.
153
v. stirring up litigation
Moreover, unless the Court backs off from its use of nondeferential
rationality review, attorneys could be forced to raise rationality chal-
lenges and load up the courts with nonmeritorious constitutional issues.
146. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
147. 457 U.S. 202.
148. Id. at 217-18, 224, 230.
149. Id. at 218 n.16.
150. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
151. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
152. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added).
153. See infra pp. 487-89.
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Attorneys, after all, have a duty of zealous representation; the rules of
professional responsibility require attorneys to advance all nonfrivolous
arguments that support their clients' interests. Thus, if the Court contin-
ues to use rationality review to strike down government action from time
to time, the Court will be inviting and encouraging attorneys to raise
rationality challenges. This will burden the government with litigation
and could substantially interfere with expeditious government action.
3. The vice of vagueness: dangers of judicial bias
One of the main problems with contemporary means-end scrutiny is
that the analytical structures are so flexible and the tests so vague that
judges are left at large to decide cases on the basis of personal bias. In
other words, means-end scrutiny too often degenerates into mere after-
the-fact rationalization for decisions made on the basis of economic and
political prejudice. The same problem existed and generated much criti-
cism in the pre-1937 period, when reactionary Justices such as the four
horsemen-Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler-inter-
vened on an ad hoc basis, nullifying government action that struck them
as unreasonable.
The post-1937 period produced two principles restricting the ad
hoc, free-wheeling quality of means-end scrutiny. First, the intensity of
rationality review was reduced to the vanishing point, thus preventing
judges from using that test as an activist, interventionist tool. Second,
strict scrutiny was applied so strictly that it led almost automatically to
invalidation of government action, preventing judges from putting a
stamp of approval on invasions of constitutional rights. In other words,
the tests virtually compelled the judges to reach predictable results re-
gardless of their personal biases.
Developments in means-end scrutiny during the Burger era de-
stroyed this predictability and reintroduced serious problems of judicial
bias. First, the softening of strict scrutiny made it possible for judges to
ratify serious infringements of fundamental constitutional rights. Strict
scrutiny is no longer fatal in fact, so judges are free to uphold invasions
of constitutional rights when they believe a sufficient countervailing justi-
fication is present. The watered-down version of strict scrutiny now in
use focuses on standards so nebulous that judges are once again free to
make virtually ad hoc decisions based on personal bias regarding the im-
portance of government interests, the effectiveness of means, and the
availability of equally effective alternatives.
Second, the emergence of rationality review with a bite has made it
possible for judges to resume constitutional censorship of government ac-
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tion that concerns merely socio-economic relationships rather than fun-
damental constitutional liberties. Rather than being required to keep
"hands off," judges are once again being encouraged to intervene piece-
meal and nullify government action that strikes them as unreasonable.
Like softened strict scrutiny, the nondeferential rational relation test is so
nebulous that judges are free to write their personal biases into constitu-
tional law just like the four horsemen did before the 1937 constitutional
revolution.
Third, the emergence of an array of intermediate levels of scrutiny
has made matters still more ambiguous. The standards involved in inter-
mediate scrutiny are so vague as to provide virtually no guidance for
judges and lawyers. 154 With no strong presumption of either constitu-
tionality or unconstitutionality to guide them, judges are free to act on
the basis of their own economic and political biases.
115
This development is not desirable.156 The Supreme Court should
attempt to resurrect some neutral principles in the area of means-end
scrutiny and reduce the potential for biased, ad hoe constitutional deci-
sion-making by tightening up on strict scrutiny and easing up on ration-
ality review. 157 It is better, at least at the top and bottom ends of the
means-end scrutiny scale, to have rules that control the bias of judges
154. Contending that middle-tier scrutiny imposes "no check on policy preferences," one
commentator asserts, "[t]he temper of the language in the various opinions suggests that the
judgments reflect the justices' hidden agendas." Seeburger, supra note 123, at 615.
155. As Justice Rehnquist put it,
How is this Court to divine what objectives are important? How is it to determine
whether a particular law is 'substantially' related to the achievement of such objec-
tive... ? Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjec-
tive judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation ....
Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156. The danger of bias on the part of judges has been made far worse by the Reagan
administration's method of selecting federal judges. Using an ideological litmus test, the ad-
ministration has been packing the federal courts with reactionaries. By the end of the Reagan
years, Reagan appointees will fill more than half the seats on federal courts. The Reagan
judges-perhaps they should be called "Meese's pieces"-will be likely to use the latitude
provided by the current version of means-end scrutiny to write their reactionary views into
constitutional law. They will water down fundamental constitutional rights by finding coun-
tervailing justifications sufficient to satisfy softened strict scrutiny. They will be tempted to
intervene in the socio-economic arena and strike down economic reform legislation that seems
ineffective when viewed through the lenses of the Chicago School economic analysis or some
other conservative ideology.
157. Admittedly, nondeferential rationality review has produced some good results in the
hands of liberal judges. E.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; Plyler, 457 U.S. 202; Moreno, 413 U.S.
528. However, the danger of abuse by reactionary judges probably outweighs the potential for
good at this point. Thus, it would seem better to go back to the deferential rational basis test
in cases where intensified review cannot be justified.
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and lead to predictable outcomes.' 58
4. Encroachment of means-end scrutiny into new areas
The Court has become so accustomed to means-end scrutiny that it
is tempted to extend it into new areas of constitutional law in a manner
that may seriously erode fundamental constitutional protections. As
mentioned before, the Justices have, for the most part, adopted the view
that constitutional rights are not absolute, but that they must at times
yield to other compelling needs. Means-end scrutiny is the most com-
mon method for determining whether a countervailing need exists that
outweighs a constitutional right in a particular case. Thus, it is a short
jump for the Justices to convert constitutional limits intended to be abso-
lute or virtually absolute bans into mere admonitions that can be set
aside whenever necessary to serve a sufficiently important interest. If
strict scrutiny were really strict, this would perhaps not be a major prob-
lem. But, given the Court's pronounced softening of strict scrutiny,
159
the danger of erosion of important constitutional rights becomes serious.
Perhaps the best example of this process and its attendant dangers is
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Garrett v. United States, 60 a double jeop-
ardy case. The double jeopardy prohibition has been viewed traditionally
as an absolute bar where applicable. In her Garrett concurrence, how-
ever, Justice O'Connor suggested that a strict scrutiny test be adopted.
Asserting that the double jeopardy clause is not absolute, Justice
O'Connor argued that the clause must yield when clearly outweighed by
countervailing interests:
[T]he finality guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause is not
absolute, but instead must accommodate the societal interest in
prosecuting and convicting those who violate the law ...
[A]bsent "governmental oppression of the sort against which
the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect," . . . the
compelling public interest in punishing crimes can outweigh
the interest of the defendant in having his culpability conclu-
sively resolved in one proceeding. 161
In Justice O'Connor's judgment, the double jeopardy interest was out-
158. Predictability and control may not be as possible in the middle tiers of means-end
scrutiny.
159. See supra pp. 475-80.
160. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
161. Id. at 796 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978)).
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weighed in Garrett by the interest in punishing crime, and the double
jeopardy clause must therefore yield.
In other words, Justice O'Connor would convert the double jeop-
ardy clause from an absolute bar into a presumption that could be over-
come if strict scrutiny is satisfied. The danger is obvious. In Garrett and
other recent cases, Justices have suggested that crime prevention is a
compelling interest. If this is true, strict scrutiny could be easily satisfied
whenever multiple prosecutions are a substantially effective way to pun-
ish crime and no less onerous alternative exists. The loophole is espe-
cially great in light of the Court's tendency to apply strict means scrutiny
in a casual, deferential manner. Given the diaphanous nature of even the
most intense forms of intensified scrutiny, the Court should be very re-
luctant to allow means-end scrutiny to encroach into new areas of consti-
tutional law.
C. Suggestions for Improving Means-End Scrutiny
The purpose of this section is to set forth an agenda of reforms
designed to make means-end scrutiny a more understandable, consistent
and effective analytical process for enforcing constitutional limits, The
proposals are derived from the discussion in earlier sections and, in many
cases, they track points already mentioned. This section is designed to
present these proposals in a more succinct and systematic manner. The
proposals fall into two main categories: (1) clarifications of terminologi-
cal ambiguities and inconsistencies and (2) resolutions of problems with
specific tiers of means-end scrutiny.
1. Clarification of conceptual structure, terminology, components and
intensity of means-end scrutiny
a. restructuring strict scrutiny
The Court should revise the structure of strict scrutiny to make it
consistent with other forms of intensified scrutiny. This can be achieved
without any change in the operation of the test. The proposed new defi-
nition is that strict scrutiny requires the government to prove that its
action is "substantially related to a compelling interest."
Revised strict scrutiny
1. End: compelling interest and
2. Means: substantial relation, i.e.,
a. Substantially effective and
b. Necessary
MEANS-END SCRUTINY
Strong presumption of constitutionality; government has bur-
den of proof
This change would: (1) provide a consistent analytical structure for
the different levels of means-end scrutiny; (2) allow the terms "end scru-
tiny" and "means scrutiny" to take on a single, consistent definition; and
(3) highlight the existence of the substantial effectiveness prong of strict
scrutiny. 162
b. clarifying the terms "end scrutiny" and "means scrutiny"
Having relocated the substantial effectiveness test from the end scru-
tiny (compelling interest) component to the means scrutiny component
of strict scrutiny, the Court should establish clear and consistent defini-
tions of the terms "end scrutiny" and "means scrutiny." "End scrutiny"
should refer to analysis of the permissibility and weight of the govern-
ment's interests (purposes). "Means scrutiny" should be defined as hav-
ing two components: (1) analysis of the effectiveness of the methods
adopted by the government to advance its interests and (2) analysis of the
availability of less restrictive alternatives.
c. clarifying the levels of "end scrutiny"
The Court should settle on a consistent vocabulary for describing
the levels of end scrutiny. Strict scrutiny should require a "compelling"
or "very important" interest., Intermediate scrutiny should require an
"important" interest. The terms "substantial interest" and "significant
interest" should be defined. If they mean something different from "im-
portant," that should be explicitly stated, and a new level of intensified
scrutiny should be identified to account for this difference. Somewhat
heightened scrutiny should require a "legitimate" interest. Rationality
review should require a "legitimate" or "valid" interest. The terms used
to describe end scrutiny should not be used interchangeably. Vague
though they may be, they can be of some use in describing the level of
end scrutiny if they are kept separate and used in a consistent manner.
d. clarifying the existence, meaning and terminology of the substantial
effectiveness component of means-end scrutiny
The Court should declare that the various levels of intensified scru-
tiny do have a "substantial effectiveness" component. Ironically, this ba-
sic and often-invoked test has so often been buried in the Court's
discussions that it remains nebulous and even unrecognized by many
162. Points two and three will be discussed further in ensuing sections.
January 1988]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:449
judges and lawyers. This is especially true in strict scrutiny cases, but it
is also true in the lower levels of intensified scrutiny, where the Court's
unclear and inconsistent terminology has obscured the test. The Court
should select a single, unequivocal term for the test and define the term
clearly. "Substantial effectiveness" is one possible term. Others might
do as well. The Court should explain that the test requires the govern-
ment to prove that the method chosen by the government is actually
effective in furthering its interest. The Court should then discard other
confusing and misleading names for the test, or at least declare that they
are synonymous. For example, the Court should rename the Central
Hudson 163 "directly advances" test and clarify that the "substantial rela-
tion" test includes both substantial effectiveness and necessity
requirements.
e. eliminating or at least clarifying the "deferential" version of the
substantial effectiveness test
The Court should reinforce the traditional concept that the substan-
tial effectiveness test is an intensified form of means scrutiny that is to be
applied in a nondeferential manner. This means that the burden is on the
government to prove that its means are actually effective, and courts are
required to make an independent judgment on the issue rather than de-
ferring to the judgment of the branch of government whose conduct is
being challenged. In short, the deferential version of the test that has
emerged in cases like City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 164 should
be eliminated.'65
If the Court rejects this suggestion, then it should at least explain
clearly when the deferential version of the test is to be used and when
not. More specifically, the Court should clearly indicate that deference is
not to be granted in strict and intermediate scrutiny cases. If deference is
to be required at all, it should only be in "somewhat heightened" and
"sub-intermediate" scrutiny cases. In other words, if the substantial ef-
fectiveness test is to vary in intensity in different classes of cases, it is
crucial that the Court clearly define when the deferential version does not
apply. Otherwise strict and intermediate effectiveness scrutiny will be
watered down to glorified versions of rationality review.
163. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
164. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
165. Deferential effectiveness scrutiny is appropriate in applying minimum rationality re-
view, but not in applying intensified scrutiny.
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f clarifying the necessity test
Similarly, the Court should take steps to prevent the erosion of the
necessity (narrowly tailored; least onerous alternative) test. Two steps
are needed. First, the Court should make it clear that, to qualify for
consideration, less onerous alternatives need not be "equally effective."
It is enough, as the older cases hold, that an alternative is substantially
effective, i.e., that it would get the job done. Second, and equally impor-
tant, the Court should eliminate the novel "deferential" version of alter-
natives analysis that has emerged in the last few years. The Court should
clearly explain that judges are required to exercise independent judgment
concerning the existence of effective and less onerous alternatives.
Otherwise this crucial test will disappear and be replaced by another va-
riation of rationality review. Again, if the Court does not adopt this sug-
gestion, it should at least take steps to define when deferential necessity
analysis applies in order to prevent encroachment of this eroded test in
intermediate and strict scrutiny cases.
To summarize the last two sections, the Court should explain
whether the substantial effectiveness and the necessity prongs of means
scrutiny are sliding scales that vary with the particular type of intensified
scrutiny being used. If these tests are meant to have a single meaning in
all cases, that should be explained. If the tests are meant to vary in inten-
sity, that should be clarified. It is especially important that the Court
clarify when means scrutiny is to be applied in a deferential manner.
Otherwise the danger exists that the deferential versions of means scru-
tiny that have emerged in recent years will be adopted throughout the
range of intensified scrutiny reducing even strict means scrutiny to little
more than rationality review.
g. clarifying the terminology of means scrutiny
The Court should define more carefully the terms commonly used to
describe means scrutiny. "Substantially related" should include both
"substantially effective" and "necessary." "Close fit" should be synony-
mous with "substantially related." "Narrowly tailored" should be sy-
nonymous with "necessary." By clarifying these terms, the Court can
avoid confusion on the part of its readers concerning the precise test be-
ing articulated and applied in intensified scrutiny cases.
h. eliminating pro forma intensified scrutiny
It follows from prior suggestions that the Court should studiously
avoid lapsing into the kind of roll over and belly up "intensified" scrutiny
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that took place in Playtime Theatres. Such scrutiny is intensified in name
only, and it utterly degrades the concept of intensified means-end scru-
tiny. If the Court intends to authorize this kind of deferential means-end
scrutiny, it should forthrightly declare that rationality review is applica-
ble rather than undermining the integrity of intensified scrutiny. Other-
wise lower courts will conclude that intensified scrutiny can be satisfied
with a wink and a nod, and basic constitutional limits will erode to the
vanishing point.
2. Resolving problems in the tiers of means-end scrutiny
a. strict scrutiny
The Court should tighten up considerably on strict scrutiny. The
list of compelling interests should not be expanded except for extremely
important needs. Scrutiny of the effectiveness of means should be truly
strict: no lapse into undue deference or rationality review should be al-
lowed. Scrutiny of alternatives should also be intensified: courts should
be required to search diligently for substantially effective and less oner-
ous alternatives. If, in a particular line of cases-such as free exercise
cases-scrutiny is not to be truly strict, the Court should explicitly adopt
a lower level of scrutiny such as intermediate or sub-intermediate scru-
tiny. In this way, strict scrutiny can be preserved as almost an absolute
ban, and high priority constitutional limits can be saved from serious
erosion.
b. middle-tier scrutiny
The Court should try to clear up the muddle that has developed ifi
the intermediate and lower tiers of intensified scrutiny. Given the huge
discrepancy between the Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan 166
version of intermediate scrutiny, with its requirement of an "exceedingly
persuasive justification," '67 and the Playtime Theatres version of abjectly
deferential "intensified" scrutiny, 68 the Court should declare whether
intensified but not strict scrutiny is indeed several tests or a sliding scale
and what factors control the degree of scrutiny required. Thus, for ex-
ample, the Court should clarify whether a difference exists between the
"important" interest required in Hogan and the "significant" interest re-
quired in Playtime Theatres. Similarly, as stated several times before, the
Court should define when, if ever, deferential means scrutiny, i.e., effec-
166. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
167. Id. at 724.
168. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41.
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tiveness and/or alternatives scrutiny, is appropriate. Furthermore, the
Court should define more clearly the "substantial relation" test that con-
trols in most forms of intensified scrutiny. It is especially important that
the Court clearly indicate that the "narrowly tailored" requirement is a
standard ingredient of the substantial relation test.
c. rationality review
In contrast, the Court should probably soften rationality review. If
nondeferential scrutiny is appropriate, the Court should invoke intensi-
fied scrutiny and clearly explain why it made this choice. If intensified
scrutiny is not justifiable, the deferential rational basis test should proba-
bly be used. Otherwise, lower court judges will be encouraged to engage
in ad hoc constitutional censorship like that of the pre-1937 Court. Per-
haps in the hands of Platonic guardians like Brennan and Stevens,
nondeferential rationality review can produce good results, 169 but, in the
hands of reactionaries such as McReynolds and Manion, the process may
produce less palatable results. Moreover, the beneficial results can be
achieved equally well by explicit use of intensified scrutiny.
If the Court rejects this suggestion and continues to invoke
nondeferential, "second order" rationality review, the Court should at
least define the factors that justify the abandonment of the deference that
is the general rule in rationality review cases. Justice Marshall's list is
probably the best bet to date with its focus on: (1) the harm done; (2) the
characteristics of the persons harmed; and (3) the nature of the govern-
ment's need.
Finally, if the Court chooses to continue using nondeferential ra-
tionality review, the Court should clarify who has the burden of proof in
cases such as City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 170 and
Plyler v. Doe 171 that are close to the line between nondeferential rational-
ity review and bottom-level intensified scrutiny.
III. CONCLUSION
Means-end scrutiny, the form of judicial analysis used most fre-
quently in constitutional cases, is in need of restructuring and reform.
Like any conceptual structure that grows piecemeal, means-end scrutiny
is infected with conceptual and terminological inconsistencies that need
to be corrected. Moreover, the process of gradual judicial inclusion and
169. See cases cited supra note 157.
170. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
171. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
January 1988)
496 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:449
exclusion that has given rise to the various levels and types of means-end
scrutiny has led the Court into some danger zones that invite modifica-
tions and improvements. If the suggested modifications are made,
means-end scrutiny will hopefully be easier to understand and apply, and
both judges and lawyers will be better able to carry out their proper func-
tions in constitutional analysis.
